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The subject I have chosen is "Trade Union Democracy and the
Law." I have therefore undertaken to submit to you some reflections on
one of the most urgent and controversial aspects of modern democracy,
the problem Of distribution of power inside the unions. I shall not
attempt to develop this problem in all its ramifications. Like other
problems of power, it is a legal issue to a limited extent only, and
it is the legal aspect alone which is my concern. I should first like to
place the problem in context, in the framework of modern democratic
society as a whole, and then approach it from the angle of the law,
to see what contribution the law has made or could make towards its
solution. It would be presumptuous for me to try to talk to you about
your own controversies and your own law. I shall assume that it may
be of interest to you to hear something about the contribution legisla-
tion and the courts have made to these matters in England. I will leave
it to you to draw the necessary comparisons with your own Labor-Man-
agement Reporting and Disclosure Act of last year. There undoubtedly
exists an enormous difference between your problems and ours, yet the
common factor both in law and in fact is sufficiently great to lend
some significance to English developments from an American point of
view.
It would, I think, be very wrong, to view the problem of so-called
trade union democracy in isolation. The distribution of power between
the members of an organization, their elected organs, and the per-
manent office holders is not a specific trade union issue at all. Nor is it
a specific trade union issue how far and by what means minorities
should be protected, how far and by what means participation in demo-
cratic processes should be safeguarded for the benefit of the individual
against discriminatory measures arising from group interest or preju-
dice, or how far and by what means the individual should be given some
guarantee of access to the sources of information on the financial,
electoral and other affairs of the body politic to which he belongs. All
these problems arise in organizations of a non-political as well as of
a political character, from the government of the country itself to the
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smallest village sports club, and from gigantic business corporations
to the tiniest municipal authority.
Nevertheless, in our time these problems have assumed dimensions
of which our ancestors were hardly able to dream. This is, of course,
due to the increasing complexities of social techniques of management,
finance and policy making, an important point in the trade union con-
text. It is also due to the growth in sheer size of our political, com-
mercial and social organizations, and to the need for centralization
which arises therefrom. In other words, to use the pungent phrases
which American authors produce so prolifically, it has something to do
with the "managerial revolution" and something to do with the "curse
of bigness." The estrangement of people from the handling of their
own affairs, the temptation to forego the exercise of powers of self-
government and to entrust the handling of collective business to the
trained expert are things which in societies such as ours are almost
inevitable. But in the long run they involve that abdication of the
citizen, that half sceptical, half confident indifference towards public
affairs which is the real danger t6 democracy. This mixture of "what
can I do anyway?" and of "they know best, I can't be bothered"-
this amalgam of feelings of impotence and of optimistic trustfulness is
not a specific characteristic of trade unionism. It is perhaps the out-
come of our urbanized civilization in which the living neighborhood
relationship has given way to membership in anonymous organizations.
I hope I shall be forgiven for producing here these sociological
truisms. I have mentioned these all too familiar phenomena because I
should like, if I may, to link them with another characteristic of our
Western societies which, I submit to you, is especially important in
connection with trade unions. Democracy, as we all know, has its his-
torical roots to a large extent in the needs of communities which fight
for their existence against forces of nature, or against political
enemies, or against economic and social adversaries. To keep democ-
racy alive in a body which is no longer struggling for its existence,
which is "recognized" as a participant in well regulated procedures is no
easy task. Am I exaggerating when I say that the problem of trade
union democracy as a social problem derives its poignancy to no small
extent from the conditions of a high level of employment and, to use
another one of your admirable phrases, of an "affluent society"?
Suppose for a moment I am right in saying that the estrangement
between union members and union affairs can be explained in terms of
social psychology. It surely follows that whatever contribution the law
can make must be very limited indeed. Nevertheless I suggest to you
that this question of union democracy has a much deeper political and
therefore potentially legal significance than the superficially compar-
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able problem of the so-called "shareholders' democracy," and the
question of how to reconcile the participation rights of investors with
the needs of efficient business management. The rights and duties of
the citizen as a union member have a much greater impact on the
totality of his existence than his rights and duties as an investor. If
he has the necessary funds or credit he may invest in any number of
companies (and if he is wise he will spread his interest) but he can
have only one job. He may choose not to invest in corporate enter-
prise, but rather to buy real estate ,or government bonds or paintings.
Yet how many people have any choice whether or not to work for
wages? The job, then, is a far more intimate element of a man's life
than his investments. Union membership is often a condition for
getting and holding a job, but whether it is or not, what the union is
and does determines in a decisive way the mode of its members'
existence. For this reason trade unions are more comparable to politi-
cal than to any other social organization. Also for this reason, labor
law in general and trade union law in particular concern the employee
in a human way, but the employer only in a business way. Trade union
democracy has more to do with political democracy than with share-
holders' rights or with the organization .of clubs. This is what engages
our attention and our obligation as citizens and as lawyers.
Nor is this all. A modern democracy is as unthinkable without trade
unions as it is without political parties. In any realistic sense unions are
a necessary part of a democratic constitution, and this, I think, for
two main reasons. In the first place they have a very special signifi-
cance as pressure groups. This is no less true in Britain than it is in the
United States, although, owing to the profound difference between a
Presidential and a Parliamentary democracy, the pressure may be ap-
plied at different points. It is certainly true of Britain, and I suspect to
some extent also true of this country, that one of the Most important
functions of a trade union in a democracy is to operate as a pressure
group inside a political party, and, what is more, to be the channel
through which the worker can give support, above all financial support,
to the party which he feels represents his interests. This is one reason
why unions are necessary elements in democratic constitutions. The
other is that they are organs of legislation. Collective bargaining is a
form of legislation, and in this country as in Britain it is the principal
form of law making in the matters relating to the way most people earn
their livelihood. Even in countries such as France or Germany where
governmental legislation is so much more important in labor relations,
collective bargaining is an essential factor in determining the workers'
rights and duties. The unions are organs of legislation, quite irrespec-
tive of whether a law such as yours makes them "statutory bargaining
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representatives" of all workers in the bargaining unit irrespective of
membership, or whether, as in Britain and on the European Continent,
they represent only their members. Nor does it matter whether the law
enforces collective agreements through courts or administrative agen-
cies. Whether the guarantees of union participation in the legislative
process are legal, as in the United States, or political, as they pri-
marily are in Britain, the unions are, as Chief Justice Stone said more
than 15 years ago:
clothed with power not unlike that of a legislature which is subject
to constitutional limitations on its power to deny, restrict, destroy
or discriminate against the rights of those for whom it legislates
and which is also under an affirmative constitutional duty to pro-
tect those rights.
As pressure groups then, and as law making agencies the unions
occupy a unique position in our societies. This gives a unique impor-
tance to the processes through which office holders are selected, de-
cisions made, minorities protected, and individual participation rights
safeguarded inside the unions. To this extent, their internal affairs are
today different in kind and not just in degree from those of other
voluntary associations. No union official has a locus standi in the forum
of public opinion to argue that internal union democracy is exclusively
the union's private affair. It is everybody's business, even if the union
does not wield full control over jobs.
Here however we face our dilemma. It is all very well to say that
union affairs are public affairs, that union government is in any but a
narrowly legalistic sense public government, and it is all very well to
lay stress on the freedom of the individual and on minority rights in-
side unions, and to talk about them in language derived from the vo-
cabulary of constitutional law. There is, however, another side of the
matter, and a very important side. The unions represent interests;
they are bargaining bodies, and, if need be, fighting organizations. The
right and the power to strike is as necessary a part of a democratic
constitution as the right to bargain collectively from which it is in-
separable. Moreover, however much the unions in this country, as
in Britain, may have achieved recognition as bargaining partners and
as participants in governmental processes, their legitimate operations
(and in certain areas even now their very existence) are under attack
by social adversaries, be they employers or rival unions. Civil liberties
are said to be subject to limitations where their exercise is a "clear and
present danger" to the safety of a community which lives in a hostile
international environment. Is there no analogy here? It is only too
1 Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198 (1944).
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clear that the leading cases in which the English courts have developed
the doctrines of protection of democratic and minority rights inside
the unions have sometimes been examples of outside adversaries of
the unions utilizing (and financing) minority grievances inside the
unions. One of the provisions of the Landrum-Griffm Act (the second
proviso to section 101(a) (4) ), shows that there is little here that you
can learn from us. Perhaps to some extent these enemies of the unions
were, like Goethe's Mephistopheles, part of that force which always
desires evil and always creates good: they may have wanted to destroy
the unions and in the process they may have helped to consolidate union
democracy. Even so, we ought to be on our guard. Trade unions
exercise public functions, but they cannot exercise them unless they
remain free and autonomous. In a democratic society they are not
part of the government. They represent the interest of the workers, and
in so doing they exercise a public function. That the representation of
private interest (and, if need be, the uncompromising fight for private
interest), is a vital public function is, after all, an idea with which we,
as lawyers, can be expected to have some sympathy. The problem of
the constitutional or legal intervention inside the unions for the pro-
tection of union democracy is in some ways analogous to the problem
of legal regulation of the activities and of the conduct of lawyers. In
both cases the dilemma between protecting standards of behavior and
protecting autonomy and self-regulation is obvious. In both cases it
arises from the dialectical situation of persons and of institutions which
exercise their public function by not being part of the government and
by representing private interests. One can transform unions into part
of the governmental machinery: this is the way of totalitarian constitu-
tions. We must beware lest by overemphasizing the need for public
legal guarantees of union democracy and by forcing upon the unions a
democratic structure we destroy their democratic autonomy.
In 1957 when I had the honor of addressing the Labor Relations
Law Section of the American Bar Association in London, I pointed out
that in Britain the lawyer's role in industrial relations is insignificant
compared to what it is in this country. If I may formulate a similar
generalization with regard to domestic trade union affairs, it would
be that in Britain the general tendency is in the direction of leaving as
much as possible, far more than in the United States, to the establish-
ment of standards by the unions themselves, and to their enforcement
through public opinion and social pressure. The law intervenes mainly
to enforce the rules the unions have made for themselves. Much of
what I found in the Landrum-Griffin Act, especially your "Bill of
Rights" and your provisions on elections, I would in England find
expressed or implied in union constitutions. Other things, such as the
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publicity to be given to the constitutions of the unions and to their
accounts, I would find in the law. Still other things in your statute
I would not find at all because they are not needed. On the whole how-
ever our society is very homogeneous and, on the other hand, very
pluralistic and deeply devoted to the medieval tradition of professional
self-regulation and professional autonomy. Hence the role of legisla-
tion of the courts and of the legal profession in these matters is very
much smaller than in your country where social conflicts as well as
political issues are so much more likely to be articulated as legal
problems, largely as a result of tradition and national temperament.
Clearly the law has been and is more important as a source of standards
and as a regulator of internal union relations in the United States than
in Britain. Yet on both sides of the Atlantic the need for preserving the
self- regulating autonomy of the unions is urgent, and on both sides of
the Atlantic, union democracy appears to be mainly threatened by
deep-rooted social and psychological forces. We are, I think, all con-
vinced that the law may be able to do something but that we cannot do
much to establish or to enforce democratic standards if the rank and
file of union members are apathetic towards the decision making process
inside the union. This is your background and ours, and it is the
background against which I should now like to say a word or two about
the legal situation in Britain.
In this I shall mainly concentrate on three problems which are
much on your minds as evidenced by your legislation, cases and liter-
ature on the subject: publicity, that is "communication" or access to
information, secondly, protection of minorities, and lastly, protection
of the union constitution and especially control of elections. I shall say
little or nothing about two kindred problems to which you have also
devoted a great deal of attention. One is admission to membership be-
cause it has not as yet proved a real issue in our more homogeneous
society; the other one is discipline and expulsion which is an enormous
issue in Britain but which has been so widely discussed in recent years
that you are probably familiar with the development in our country.
May I then in the first place touch upon the problems of publicity
with which you have now dealt in section 201 of the new act. For almost
ninety years we have had a system of union registration which was
introduced in 1871 by the Trade Union Act of that year. Registration
under the 1871 act is purely voluntary, and in this respect quite dif-
ferent from the registration systems in some other parts of the world,
including some of the British territories outside the United Kingdom.
A trade union in Britain has the full status of a trade union without
being registered; it has full factual collective bargaining powers, locus
standi before arbitration boards and government departments, quite
1961]
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irrespective of registration. It also has, whether registered or not, the
essential legal immunities of a trade union under British law, such as
immunity from suit in tort2 and immunity from certain claims of a
domestic nature, especially from direct claims for benefit.3 The privi-
leges which registration confers are useful without being vital. There
is a very limited income tax privilege,4 not particularly important in
practice, and there are a number of conveyancing facilities and other
advantages in connection with the technicalities of property admin-
istration;5 there are also summary remedies against fraudulent mis-
appropriation of union funds and other property. A registered union
also has the advantage that it can sue in court in its own name, rather
than in the name of its trustees or by a representative action,7 and the
corresponding disadvantage (if such it is) that it can be sued in con-
tract in its own name. The comparatively minor privileges I have men-
tioned, and a few others,' cannot explain why practically all the larger
unions of employees and workers have in fact obtained registration so
that today roughly eight out of nine union members belong to reg-
istered unions.
It may sound paradoxical, but I am convinced that it is true that
the unions register not because of these insignificant privileges, but
on the contrary because of the very significant obligations registration
imposes upon them. As my colleague B. C. Roberts says in his book,
Trade Union Government,9 the motive is the "desire of trade unionists
to conform to the standards laid down" in the statute, but of course
they could comply with these standards voluntarily without registra-
tion. However, I think what they desire is the legal compulsion to
comply, the guarantee of compliance, and the official and authentic
publicity given to such compliance. Certain elementary principles of
internal democracy are thus placed beyond controversy. No question
can be asked as to whether accounts should be published and what
accounts and how, and whether they should be audited, and how the
funds are to be invested, and whether the members can inspect the
books, and how office holders are appointed or elected, for all this-
accounts, investment, inspection, elections and the rest-is regulated
2 Trade Disputes Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 47, § 4.
3 Trade Union Act, 1871, 34-35 Vict., c. 31, § 4.
4 Income Tax Act, 1952, 15-16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 10, §§ 440-441.
5 Trade Union Act, 1871, 34-35 Vict., c. 31, §§ 7, 8.
6 Trade Union Act, 1871, 34-35 Vict., c. 31, § 12.
7 National Union of General and Municipal Workers v. Gillian, [1946] K.B. 81. For
the union's liability to be sued in contract, see Bonsor v. Musicians' Union, [1956] A.C.
104.
8 For these, see Citrine, Trade Union Law 126-28 (2d ed. 1960).
9 Roberts, Trade Union Government and Administration in Great Britain 18 (1957).
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either by the statute itself, by regulations, or overwhelmingly by the
union's rules which are public property, having been filed at the Reg-
istrar's office. Publicity of constitutional and financial procedures is,
I suppose, one of the cornerstones of what we call democracy, and to
some extent registration guarantees not only this publicity itself, but
also that no one can accuse the union leaders of having tried to avoid
it. It does a lot, I think, to remove friction and to smooth the day to
day lives of the unions, and this must be one of the main causes why
the unions seek registration. Some may feel that, whatever you may
think about your new act in general, what I have said may perhaps
supply an argument for the publicity provisions in section 201.
One should not on the other hand exaggerate the effect of registra-
tion on union democracy in Britain. The Registrar's powers are strictly
limited, and it has been argued, wrongly in some respects and perhaps
rightly in others, that they should be enlarged. A registered union
must have a written constitution in the form of rules, and these must
make provision for the appointment of trustees' in whom all union prop-
erty vests. 1 The trustees are always union members. These rules must
also provide for a number of other matters, such as conditions for ben-
efit, investment of funds, periodical audit of accounts, inspection of
books, union objects, etc. The rules can be inspected by anyone at the
Registrar's office, and each union member is entitled to a copy on pay-
ment of a small fee. If the Registrar has received an application for
registration by a body of persons which complies with the act, and
rules which are in order, and if all formalities are complied with, he
must register the union. He has no discretion, and if he refuses, man-
damus lies against him. He cannot reject the rules, for example, be-
cause he feels that the democratic rights of members are not sufficiently
safeguarded. He receives the rules and gives them publicity, but if they
comply with the formal requirements of the law, he has no power to
approve or to disapprove. The British registration procedure is con-
sequently a guarantee of publicity and little more. There is very little
in our law to correspond to the titles I and IV of your new statute.
A registered union must give full publicity to its constitution and
all amendments,'" and also to the names of its officers. 13 Further, as I
have indicated, the law compels a registered union to observe certain
standards of financial administration, to transmit to the Registrar and
thus to the public an annual return including a balance sheet as well as
a revenue and expenditure account, with detailed statements of the
10 Trade Union Act, 1871, 34-35 Vict., c. 31, § 14(1), First Schedule No. 4.
1 Trade Union Act, 1871, 34-35 Vict., c. 31, § 8.
12 Trade Union Act, 1871, 34-35 Vict., c. 31 §§ 13(1), 16.
3 Ibid.
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various heads of expenditure, all in the form prescribed by the Registrar
and with the particulars demanded by him. 14 Each member is entitled to
a copy of the accounts free of charge 5 and is entitled to inspect the
books, a right thought to include permission to make copies of extracts
from the books. For most union members this would not be much of
a benefit if they did not also have a legally protected opportunity of
using the services of an expert accountant. The statute is silent on this,
but the courts have decided that the right to inspect includes the right
to have such assistance. 6 I think I am right in saying that here for
once we go further than you do, because your section 201(c) seems to
me to say that the members can inspect the books only "for just cause."
I do not feel that this would go down well with British trade unionists.
Again, in the matter of finance as in the matter of democratic par-
ticipation rights, the institutional guarantee of publicity is all that our
law provides. The Registrar enforces it, but he has no right to order
an inquiry. All he does is to ensure that the published accounts are in
order as a matter of form, but I believe this publicity itself is of great
value in removing distrust. These provisions were enacted in 1871 at
a time when trade union funds were still occasionally in danger of
being robbed by unfaithful trade union officials; there were some well
known scandals in the 1860's. The facts seem to show that these pub-
licity provisions have had their desired effect.
From what I have said you may arrive at too low an estimate of
the importance of the Registrar. His legal powers are mainly formal,
but his influence in practice is greater than the bare wording of the
statute suggests. Like the monarch according to Bagehot, he can
neither enforce nor can he prevent a policy, but like Bagehot's king he
can, and by all accounts he does, warn and encourage. It is remarkable
for instance, that there are only few examples of union rules which
give a power to expel without a proper hearing. This would probably be
against "natural justice," but there has never been an actual decision
on the point, and the paucity of such clauses may well be ascribed to
the silent and informal but quite effective influence of the Registrar
and his officers. To some extent this is our equivalent of your Bill of
Rights and election provisions.
Let me now turn to the question of protecting minorities. Here
the provisions of the 1871 act do not go very far. All they do is to
insure that a dissatisfied minority has at least a chance of knowing
what its rights are. Moreover, the courts have indirectly strengthened
14 Trade Union Act, 1871, 34-35 Vict., c. 31, § 16.
15 Ibid.
16 Dodd v. Amalgamated Marine Workers' Union, [1924] 1 Ch. 116; Norey v.
Keep, [1909] 1 Ch. 561.
[Vol. 22
TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY
the hands of minorities threatened with disciplinary action by devel-
oping and greatly enlarging the rights and remedies available in the
case of wrongful expulsion, by insisting that any hearing should be fair
and impartial, that the rules should be strictly observed, and that the
court has the power to interpret their meaning,'7 and especially by hold-
ing over the union the threat of heavy damages.'"
This problem of minorities in Britain however has certain aspects
which may be different from those familiar to you. Policy making in-
side the unions is probably more centralized in some respects in Britain
than in the United States, owing not only to the smaller size of the
country but also to the prevalence of industry wide bargaining with
employers' associations. The central union administration is generally
more cautious than the branch (which is our word for "local"). Do-
mestic union conflicts frequently arise from a feeling among the rank
and file that the leaders are not sufficiently militant. I recall a dock
strike in 1951 when this was made more explicit than usual. There the
minority leaders, the members of the unofficial "strike committee,"
proclaimed to the world that one of their objects was "to ginger up the
union." This was the Transport and General Workers' Union, the
largest British trade union with more than 1% million members,
and known for its highly centralized and efficient administration. The
frequency of wildcat strikes in Britain has, I think, been exaggerated,
but they are not insignificant and they have something to do with dis-
gruntled minorities whose grievances are not always given an outlet
by very cautious and highly responsible union leaders.
It is my personal opinion that those who argue in favor of a com-
pulsory ballot before each strike being written into each union consti-
tution by force of law and in favor of supervision of such ballots by
the Registrar, completely miss the point. The shoe is on the other foot,
in Britain, and I gather here in the United States as well. The union
leaders, whether elected or appointed, have for years often been a kind
of buffer or windscreen, protecting the nation and its economy from
the more militant union minorities. If anyone needs protection in the
democratic sense, it would be these militants, and not the unfortunate
few who, though opposed to a strike, are compelled to take part in it.
I am not saying they are an extinct species (sometimes they even ap-
pear as plaintiffs in fascinating court cases' 9), but by and large they
17 Amalgated Soc'y of Carpenters v. Braithwaite, [1922] 2 A.C. 440; Lee v. Show-
men's Guild of Great Britain, [1952] 2 Q.B. 329. For an explanation on this, see Grunfeld,
"Trade Unions and the Individual: A Study of Recent Developments in England," 7
Journal of Public Law 289, 298-303 (1958). This is the best up-to-date presentation of
English domestic trade union law.
18 Bonsor v. Musicians' Union, supra note 7.
19 E.g., Huntley v. Thornton, [1957] 1 Weekly L.R. 321.
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exist mainly in the imagination of sentimental 19th Century poets and
not quite disinterested 20th Century politicians.
In so far as our problem is one of minority rights in matters of
collective bargaining and strike policy, the best the law can do in
Britain at any rate is nothing at all. But there are other problems. Race
relations have not thus far troubled internal union affairs in Britain.
I am not saying we are immune against the virus of race discrimina-
tion, but union policies fortunately have so far been in this matter
clear and clean, and strictly opposed to color bars and similar abuses.
Our minority problem is political rather than racial, and here we are
coming back to the actual law.
The British trade unions are financially and politically closely
connected with the Labour Party. They helped to establish it and have
ever since strongly influenced its policy. It has been and is financially
dependent on the unions to a very large extent. This relationship be-
tween the unions and politics is inherent in the British system of
Cabinet Government. There can be no cabinet system without strict
party discipline. Decisions on policy are largely made inside the parties,
both on the government and on the opposition side, and generally
speaking are carried out loyally by Members of Parliament. Hence,
to be effective, pressure groups have got to work inside the parties.
Trade unions everywhere have always tried to exercise political in-
fluence. In the 19th Century, as Sidney and Beatrice Webb have
shown, they did it through the method familiar to you of punishing
their enemies and rewarding their friends."0 Since the creation of the
Labour Party at the beginning of the 20th Century they have adopted
the method of working with and through that party. There is nothing
uncommon and nothing sinister in this; it is a method in no way dif-
ferent from that used by financial and commercial interests of all
sorts. The difference is, however, that what mass organizations such
as trade unions do is (and should be) done in the full light of publicity,
whereas the more subtle influence exercised by those few who control
large financial resources is commonly exercised in a confidential at-
mosphere remote from the sordid gaze of indiscreet eyes. In short,
to deprive trade unions in Britain of the right to use union funds for
political purposes would have been incompatible with a democratic
constitution.
This, however, is the point where our minority problem begins.
Over large areas, in Britain as in the United States, union membership
is only nominally voluntary. It is a characteristic of a highly developed
union movement that, with or without formal union security arrange-
20 S. and B. Webb, History of Trade Unionism, Ch. V; Industrial Democracy, Part
II, Ch. 4 (1920).
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ments, it tends to become socially compulsory. What, then, about work-
ers who, while disagreeing with the political aims pursued by the union,
are nevertheless its members by force of circumstance rather than by
choice?
In the absence of a bill of rights and a code of election standards,
it is here and only here that our statutes have formulated explicit and
very stringent principles for the protection of union minorities. In
1909 the courts decided that a registered union (the same was sub-
sequently decided in the case of an unregistered union21) was not en-
titled to apply any part of its funds to any purpose, except one of those
expressly enumerated as trade union objects in the statutes, which
means broadly activities in labor relations. Any violation of this pro-
hibition was held to be an ultra vires act. The decision in Amalga-
mated Soc'y of Ry. Servants v. Osborne22 deprived the unions of all
power to participate in political or educational activities or even
to publish a newspaper or other printed material. It was plainly in-
compatible with the democratic working of the Parliamentary system,
and, quite apart from its legal aspects, based on a profound misun-
derstanding of the place of unions in society. It was on the other hand,
however, a blow struck for the protection of unpopular minorities
inside unions. This we can admit, however much one may suspect the
motives of those who financed the Trojan horse campaign of the plain-
tiff. Looking at the Osborne case after half a century, one feels that,
untenable as it was, it did bring home the lesson that union democracy
requires some protection for political minorities.
The Trade Union Act of 1913 was an attempt, largely successful,
made by the Liberal and Labour majority of that day to find a com-
promise between the need for democratic participation of the unions
in the national affairs and the need for a measure of democracy in
their internal affairs, between democracy in the macrocosm of the state
and in the microcosm of the unions. The ultra vires rule was abol-
ished, and the unions' power to engage in all lawful activities au-
thorized by their own constitutions was restored. But they cannot spend
any money for political purposes out of their general funds. In order
to make such expenditures they must create a separate political fund,
and to do that they have to have a secret ballot and special rules for
the administration of the political fund whether they are registered or
not. The political fund rules must be approved, and not just be received
and published by the Registrar. To be approved, they must contain strin-
gent provisions for the protection of dissenters. Dissenters can as we put
it, "contract out," which means that by signing an appropriate form, they
21 Wilson v. Scottish Typographical Ass'n, 1912 Sess. Cas. 534 (Sess. Ct.).
22 [19101 A.C. 87.
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can effectively declare their unwillingness to contribute to the political
fund. Those who have done this must not in any way suffer any dis-
advantage or discrimination regarding benefits or rights to participate
in elections or in the administration-of the union, except that of course
they may be excluded from the management of the political fund itself.
Here, then, we have a pattern of legislative protection of demo-
cratic participation rights. True, it applies only to the limited area of
political dissent, but anyone interested in finding such patterns might
want to look at this legislation (with the details of which I will not
trouble here, except to say that willingness to contribute to the political
fund must not be made a condition of admission). I would however
like to give you a case to show how seriously this minority protection
is taken in practice. This case, Birch v. National Union of Railway-
men,23 was decided by a Chancery judge in 1950. The Political Fund
Rules of the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR) which had been
approved by the Registrar provided that a member who had contracted
out should not be subject to any disadvantage or disability:
except that such member shall take no part in the control or man-
agement of the political fund of the union, and shall be ineligible
to occupy any office or representative position involving such con-
trol or management.
The plaintiff who had contracted out was elected chairman of his
branch, and as such he was concerned with the general as well as the
political fund of the branch (each branch is a union for this purpose),
and he was promptly told by the General Secretary that he was in-
eligible because the branch chairmanship involved the control and
management of the political fund. This interpretation was not ques-
tioned by the judge, but he held, rightly in my opinion, that, as it stood,
the NUR's political fund rule was (though approved by the Registrar)
against the act and void, and that consequently the NUR had no
political fund and could not spend money for political purposes. The
NUR did not appeal but changed its rules, which was wiser and con-
siderably cheaper. What the decision means is that a union cannot, by
combining general union management with political fund management,
deprive a dissenting minority of its legally protected equality of op-
portunity to participate in union affairs. This protection however ex-
tends only to non-contributors to the political fund as such. It does
not extend to political minorities whose members contribute. Thus the
act did not stand in the way of those unions which decided to exclude
certain political minorities from union office, as the Transport and
General Workers Union did a few years ago with regard to Fascists
and to Communists.
23 [1950] Ch. 602.
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In conclusion I would like to add a few observations on the policy
of the courts to insist upon the strict observance of the union constitu-
tions generally, and especially in connection with elections. This policy
has become explicit, largely since the early years of this century, pre-
dominantly in expulsion cases and in connection with the administration
of union funds. The courts may through injunctions restrain any spend-
ing of union money which is not strictly within the union constitution.
The publicity of union expenditure to which I have referred makes it
comparatively easy to see how union money is spent, and since the
famous decision in 1905 of the House of Lords in Yorkshire Miners
Ass'n v. Howden,21 it has been clear that each member can ask
the court for an injunction. This was another one of those cases where
a Trojan Horse, or, if you like, a Trade Union Hampden, was helped
from outside to establish minority rights. The union was by injunction
restrained from spending money on a strike without having held the
ballot required by the rules. Such negative control by the courts is in
fact often a guarantee of constitutional procedure in matters other
than financial. The courts have intervened to prevent secessions of
branches.25 This was possible because by statute" the branch funds
can be made to vest, and normally do vest, in the trustees of the cen-
tral union, and the central trustees can thus get an injunction to pre-
vent the branch officials from dissipating the branch funds or from
handing them over to a rival union. Conversely, the courts have pro-
tected union minorities in matters of amalgamations." Union mergers
are governed by very intricate statutes" and normally also by union
rules for the protection of dissenting minorities. The ultimate control
of the purse strings by the courts is some guarantee that such provi-
sions are observed.
Not all court intervention to secure the observance of constitu-
tional rules has, however, been through the backdoor of financial con-
trol. Thus, where a union wishes to change its constitution it must ad-
here to the formalities provided in the constitution, and any attempt by
the executive to expand its power by riding roughshod over these
formalities will, even if acquiesced in by the membership, be suppressed
by the courts. This happened during the War when a Scottish trade
24 [1905] A.C. 256.
25 [1909] 2 Ch. 148.
26 Trade Union Amendment Act, 1876, 39-40 Vict., c. 22, § 3.
27 Wolfe v. Matthews, 21 Ch.D. 194 (1882); Booth v. Amalgamated Marine
Workers' Union, [1926] Ch. 904.
28 Trade Union Amendment Act, 1876, 39-40 Vict., c. 22, § 12; Trade Union
(Amalgamation) Act, 1917, 7-8 Geo. 5, c. 24. Societies (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act,
1940, § 6.
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union started to recruit temporary members 29 in the docks, and made
them sign a piece of paper that they were members for the duration
only and could be required at any time to forfeit their membership
after the end of hostilities-a pretty dangerous weapon in the hand of
the executive. The union constitution said nothing about temporary
membership, and the House of Lords eventually made a declaration
that the temporary members had been recruited ultra vires and had
never become members at all. This occurred years later in 1952. You
can see that the courts will not tolerate the development of what you
may call "conventions" of union institutions created against the clear
wording of the written constitution or alongside it by acquiescence. This
was even more vividly illustrated in a case before the Court of Appeal
in 19500 where a large craft union, the National Union of Vehicle
Builders, had violated its own rule by which dues could be raised only
through a ballot, at which a two-thirds vote in favor was needed. Such a
rule, it seems to me, goes further even than your new act does in this
respect. This rule had fallen into oblivion, as the members had for
years acquiesced in increased dues without a ballot. But eventually a
minority objected, and the court held the increase to be ultra vires and
void. In a third case, in 1955,31 the Musicians' Union, to meet an
emergency, intended to raise a general levy of 1 shilling a week for
six months, but exempted members earning less than 10 pounds a week.
The Court of Appeal restrained the union committee from proceeding
with the proposal on the ground that in substance it amounted to a
levy on a section of the membership, an inequality not warranted by
the rules. A very formalistic application of a kind of equal protection
principle, you might say, but a good illustration all the same.
This policy of enforcing the union constitution is however subject
to the opposite policy of protecting the autonomy of the union and of
not permitting unnecessary appeals to the courts from internal union
decisions if the internal mechanism of the union would have provided a
remedy. The courts have borrowed from company law the rule which
prevents a shareholder from questioning in court the validity of any
action of the company which could have been approved by a simple
majority of the shareholders, provided what he was trying to assert
was the right of the company and not a right vested in him as an
individual.32 If it is within the power of the majority to sanction the
29 Martin v. Scottish Transport and General Workers Union, [1952] 1 All E.R.
691 (M.L.).
30 Edwards v. Halliwell, [1950] 2 All E.R. 1064 (CA.).
31 O'Reilly v. Musicians' Unions, [1955] C.L.Y. 2794.
32 This is known in England as the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare. 461, 67 Eng.
Rep. 189 (1843). For an explanation, see Gower, Modem Company Law, Ch. 25 (2d ed.
1957). For its application to trade union law, see Cotter v. National Union of Seamen,
[1929] 2 Ch. 58.
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holding of a meeting which has not been properly convened, no mem-
ber can complain about the meeting having been held, and similarly
where an issue has been irregularly placed on the agenda. But this can
never cover acts which are ultra vires. The borderline between inter-
vention and non-intervention may be technically a matter of intricate
reasoning; it is in truth a compromise between autonomy and minority
rights, an uneasy compromise of policies.
All this however is not nearly as important as the proper conduct
of elections, but the difficulty here, as I see it, is not so much on the
side of the law as on that of evidence. The courts can and do un-
doubtedly intervene to see that all those entitled to vote are given an
opportunity of doing so, that the prescribed ballots are held and that
the votes are counted properly. They can and do also enforce the right
of every eligible member to be considered as a candidate for union
office and to have his campaign literature properly distributed by the
union and submitted to the members. Any election in violation of the
union rules is void and the court will issue the necessary declarations
and injunctions which has happened more than once. 3 But what does
that mean in practice if you cannot prove your facts? As I have said,
in matters of finance our law does what it can to put the facts at the
disposal of the members, and dubious financial practices are hardly a
live issue today in British unionism. But when it comes to tampering
with votes, it may be difficult for a union member to prove his case,
if he faces a hostile executive determined to conceal the facts. At the
moment we are very much concerned with the affairs of the Electrical
Trades Union (ETU) whose General Secretary, a key official, was
some time ago re-elected by a small majority. The election was hotly
disputed (the re-elected General Secretary is a Communist). It has
been widely alleged, whether rightly or wrongly I cannot say, that this
election was rigged. The matter is now sub judice, an action for an in-
junction having been brought by the defeated candidate in the High
Court. There have been a number of preliminary skirmishes. One of
them was last May34 when a candidate for the office of Assistant Gen-
eral Secretary of the union got an injunction preventing the union
from holding the election without having circulated the plaintiff's elec-
tion statement unadulterated as submitted by him. The right of the
candidate which the court enforced was, of course, based on the con-
33 See e.g., Watson v. Smith, [1941] 2 All E.R. 725 (Ch. Div.), which arose from
a dispute about the interpretation of the constitution of the Amalgamated Engineering
Union. But here, too, union autonomy places a limit to the intervention of the courts.
For a highly instructive case, see Goode v. National Union of Mineworkers, [1959] C.L.Y.
3352.
34 Chappel v. Electrical Trades Union, [1960] 5 C.L. 378; London Times, May 5,
1960. See also, Cannon v. Haxell, London Times, July 29, 1960.
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stitution of the union, and not, as might now be the case in the United
States, on a statute.
These matters have led to what may be called a certain self-ques-
tioning among the unions. There has been an open conflict between the
ETU and the General Council of the Trades Union Congress (TUC)
about these elections. The TUC, and incidentally not only the TUC,
suggested that the leading men in the ETU bring actions for libel or
slander against those who in the press, on the radio, and on television
had accused them of fraudulent manipulation of these elections, but
no such action has been brought. No wonder that the question has been
raised whether the courts and whether the Registrar have sufficient
power over union elections. The Trades Union Congress cannot really
do very much; the ultimate sanction it wields is to disaffiliate the of-
fending union. But what is the good of that? Disaffiliation would not
impair the collective bargaining power of the union, and, given the
fundamental fact that British trade unions very frequently bargain
jointly with other unions, the other unions would have to co-operate
with the disaffiliated union, co-operate in collective bargaining, on joint
industrial councils, in statutory wages councils, government commit-
tees, and all the rest. Of course, all this might be different if the TUC
encouraged the formation of a rival union as was done, I think, some
years ago by the CIO on a similar occasion. But there is little our
unions hate more than the rivalry of unions operating in the same
field, and rightly so, and for the TUC to promote what many work-
people would call a "breakaway" (which means a secession and is one
of the dirtiest words in the British trade union vocabulary) is highly
improbable. There remains therefore the possibility of a change in the
law so as to strengthen the hand of the Registrar, by giving him powers
of investigation which he does not now possess, and equally important,
powers to inspect documents referring to elections. These matters are
now under public discussion, and speaking for myself, I should say
that in this area the Landrum-Griffin Act might give food for the
thoughts of many of us. Such things, e.g., as your provisions on the
right of a candidate to have an observer at the polls and at the counting
of the ballots (section 401(c)), perhaps also those on the removal of
elected officers (section 401 (h)), and in general the powers of investiga-
tion you have now given to the Secretary of Labor (section 601), are
matters which we cannot imitate, of course, but which we ought to pon-
der. Legal institutions are not exportable, not even between common law
countries, but fortunately legal ideas are not patentable either. We
cannot copy your institutions and you cannot copy ours. But we can
learn from each other. That, I take it, is the object of a gathering such
as this, and to this worthy object I hope that I have made some small
contribution.
